Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the most important trends in nuclear power policies in the 'old' nuclear power states of Europe (including Eastern Europe and Russia) and North America, in order to put the Asian developments in nuclear power policy into a broader context. The chapter starts out by briefly outlining the main features of the most dynamic period of nuclear expansion, starting in the mid-1960s and ending in connection to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The following section then discusses the political responses to this highly critical event, which led to a total stagnation in the expansion of nuclear energy. The main thrust of the chapter, however, is on the most recent trends in European and North American nuclear power policy. It discusses, in particular, the extent to and ways in which the 'Chernobyl legacy' is being overcome, and, if so, whether this may pave the way for a new period of dynamism in the 'old' nuclear world. Sub-themes are the formal policies and strategies pursued by governments, the evolving actor landscape, investment policies and national capacities, and developments within the nuclear engineering industry.
The last and concluding section summarizes the findings.
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Nuclear power before Chernobyl
Following the commercial breakthrough of light-water reactor technology in the mid1960s, the world entered a period of intense construction in the nuclear sector, with a total of 423 reactors being taken into operation in the period 1966 -1985 (IAEA 2008 .
Nuclear power became a major contributor to electricity production. The wave of exponential growth and expansion had been preceded by more than two decades of feverish research, development and experimental activities, which took place against a background of futuristic visions of nuclear technology as a 'generic' technology that was not only to guarantee the world's energy supply for thousands of years, but also solve a variety of societal problems. Nuclear power was to be used not only for electricity generation, but also for heating, transportation, food conservation, space flight, etc.
Regarding nuclear technology for energy production, uranium-based thermal reactor development was for a long time seen merely as a first stepping stone for a much greater effort to develop more advanced nuclear technologies. Fast breeder reactors, which could use the uranium fuel much more efficiently by 'breeding' fissile plutonium from the non-fissile U-238 isotope, were expected to soon replace the thermal reactors, which were typically referred to as 'primitive' -already before they were commercialized! Breeder reactors were in those early days commonly referred to as 'second generation' reactors, whereas fusion reactors was thought of as the 'third generation' in nuclear engineering (Radkau 1983) . Some early commercial reactors had gone into operation since the mid-1950s in the leading nuclear countries, which largely coincided with the world's nuclear weapons states. The 1960s, then, saw the culmination of a struggle between different reactor designs and fuel choices, notably heavy-water and light-water moderated reactors which were to be fuelled by natural and enriched uranium, respectively. Several countries -such as Canada, Germany, France and Sweden -followed a heavy-water, natural uranium-based nuclear strategy motivated by energy security considerations in terms of independence from foreign enrichment services and the option -not necessarily officially acknowledged -of combining heavy-water reactors with weapons-plutonium production for nuclear arms.
The breakthrough of the American light-water technology as a comparatively cheap, simple and technically reliable reactor type, in combination with the emergence of a semi-free world market for uranium enrichment services, paved the way for a transition to light-water technology in most countries. Large European nations such as Germany and France also mastered the enrichment technology on their own and could thereby embark on light-water reactor programmes without compromising their security interests. Canada was the only Western country that continued to pursue a heavy-water reactor programme, and this made cooperation with Canada interesting for a number of developing countries; the latter wished to embark on nuclear programmes without becoming dependent on foreign enrichment while keeping the nuclear weapons option open.
Nuclear weapons ambitions was the main driving force in developing reprocessing technology for separating out fissile plutonium (Högselius 2009 ). However, the dream of a civil nuclear future in which fast breeder reactors were expected to play the central role, boosted the reprocessing developments considerably already at an early stage. The ambition to develop a 'closed' nuclear fuel cycle in which both plutonium and depleted uranium were separated out, to be recycled in breeder reactors and in nuclear warheads, was further strengthened by the argument that the world's uranium resources might be very limited. This argument must be seen against the very expansive nuclear visions of the early nuclear era, with nuclear power imagined to take over virtually the entire energy sector. In the 1970s governmental ambitions in a variety of countries were still extreme in this respect, and global demand for uranium was, accordingly, expected to skyrocket. In combination with the first oil crisis of 1973/74, the wave of expansion of thermal nuclear reactors (which took place in parallel with the oil crisis) gave way to enormous price increases on the uranium market in a way that seemed to confirm the need for economizing on uranium as a scarce resource and therefore invest in breeder and reprocessing technology.
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At the same time, however, the nuclear industry faced a number of serious setbacks.
Several nuclear accidents as well as enormous technical problems effectively put a brake on further developments. Had it not been for the two oil crises, it appears likely that the wave of nuclear expansion would have ended much earlier than it actually did.
Breeder engineering faced a backlash around 1967 through a series of accidents and technical problems with developing efficient and secure cooling systems (Fjaestad forthcoming) . In the early 1970s a wave of accidents in reprocessing plants followed (Varchmin and Radkau 1981) . And at the same time nuclear power for the first time came under heavy public criticism. In the late 1970s, then, several countries decided to abandon the more ambitious parts of their nuclear programmes, particularly breeder and reprocessing technology. This development was led by the United States, where President Carter issued a corresponding decree in 1977, formally motivated by nuclear proliferation concerns but in reality also responding to the enormous technical difficulties that had arisen with regard to breeder reactors and reprocessing. Sweden and Finland, two small but advanced European nations, also decided to switch to an 'open' nuclear fuel cycle without reprocessing and breeders. Austria was a notable country in abandoning its nuclear programme altogether in 1978, at a time when its first nuclear power plant was nearly complete. And a variety of other small European countries which had not yet developed any nuclear programmes, but which had made preparations, shelved their nuclear plans.
Then in 1979 the partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg in the United States put a further brake to nuclear developments in the West. In 1986 this was followed by the Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union.
Chernobyl became the ultimate breakpoint for all further nuclear developments in Europe and North America.
Chernobyl's legacy
At the time of the Chernobyl accident in April 1986, the debate about nuclear power futures was already very infected in many Western countries. Chernobyl, then, gave a final blow to nearly all future plans for nuclear expansion in the developed world.
5
Although the accident happened in the Soviet Union, with a very different type of institutional setting in the nuclear sector and with an outdated reactor type that did not resemble any Western-style reactor type (with the notable exception of the British Magnox reactors, which had also been exported to Italy and Spain), the public outcry was pervasive. Most governments in the Western democracies found it politically impossible to continue their support to nuclear developments, and although there was only in some instances a concrete prohibition against the construction of new reactors, nuclear operators felt that the long-term political risks were so great that any new investments appeared highly uncertain and risky. Chernobyl also raised new demands for additional, expensive security measures and thereby served to extend the trend from the 1970s of rapidly rising costs for nuclear power plant construction.
The political development was more radical in some countries than others. Countries such as Italy, Germany and Sweden decided (at different points in time) to decommission all their nuclear power and put a ban on new reactor construction. Italy was the first large country to actually decommission all its nuclear capacity (the shutdowns were completed by 1990). Sweden had held a national referendum on the future of nuclear power already in 1980 (following the Three Mile Island incident) which had resulted in a parliamentary decision to decommission all nuclear power by 2010. In the years following the referendum, the political winds turned and it appeared that the decision might be reversed. The Chernobyl accident, however, reminded both the public and politicians of the reality of nuclear risks and the decision taken back in 1980 again became the guiding principle. In Germany the Social Democrats and the Green Party pushed for a similar line of development.
However, these parties were for a long time not in majority in the German parliament.
It took until 1998, when a red-green coalition won the national elections, before the German decommissioning policy could be launched.
Other countries also became much more hesitant to nuclear power. Switzerland issued a ten-year moratorium on new nuclear constructions following the result of a national referendum held in 1990 (at which 55% voted in favour of the moratorium). In the United Kingdom, a 1988 white paper expressed severe concerns with the costs of nuclear power, although it still saw it as a necessary source of energy; the 1989-90 energy market reforms, then, led to a substantial loss in prestige for the government 6 as it proved impossible to find a buyer of the to-be-privatized nuclear industry (which hence remained in state hands up to 1996, when a decision was taken to sell only the most modern nuclear plants, whereas the obsolete Magnox stations remained with the Ironically, regarding the public stance to nuclear power, the Chernobyl accident had a lesser impact in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe and North America. Gorbachev's glasnost policy in the late 1980s did lead to the emergence of openly anti-nuclear movements, which had some impact. In most cases, however, these anti-nuclear movements -particularly in Lithuania, Armenia and Ukraine -were in essence national liberation movements in Soviet republics that strove for national independence from Moscow (Dawson 1996) . All in all the public stance to nuclear power after Chernobyl remained much more positive in Eastern than in Western Europe.
Current trends in Europe and North America
Government policies and strategies
The last decade has seen significant changes in nuclear policy in both Europe and in these countries the broad underlying trend is now towards a more positive stance to nuclear energy. A notable development in this connection is that some of those countries that in the post-Chernobyl years decided to halt further nuclear expansion or even decommission existing plants have recently revised these decisions.
There are two factors that more than any others have served as arguments for shifting the anti-nuclear policies of the post-Chernobyl period in a more pro-nuclear direction:
the first is the climate crisis and the second is the problematic dependence on imported fossil fuels. Both factors can be thought of as being related to energy security, defined in a broad sense as involving three types of risk: environmental risk, supply risk and price risk (cf. Gupta 2007):
• Environmental risks. Nuclear power has since Harrisburg and Chernobyl, at the latest, been seen to involve enormous environmental risks, with a focus both on accident risks and environmental problems related to fuel cycle activities and radioactive waste management. The climate crisis, however, has served to shift the environmental focus to climate change, and here nuclear power is seen as cleaner than fossil fuels in a way which, in the view of many policymakers, outweigh the risks of nuclear accidents and radioactive leakages. This trend has gained momentum particularly in Europe in recent years following the trend towards a joint EU climate policy with binding commitments regarding reductions in CO2 emissions, in a way that forces national governments to take concrete action. However, the trend of deemphasizing nuclear-related environmental risks is also conditioned by the fact that there has been no serious nuclear accident (of the same outreach as Harrisburg or Chernobyl) since 1986.
• Supply risk. A shift in the perception of supply-related risks has taken place, • Price risk. Speculation-led turbulence in world oil markets pushed oil prices up to a level of $147 in July 2008, in a way which certainly served to favour nuclear power by comparison. Uranium prices also increased dramatically up to a peak level in 2007, but since the costs of producing nuclear electricity is not very sensitive to uranium prices, the overall market turbulence on fuel markets point in favour of nuclear energy.
All in all, in recent political debate nuclear energy has seen a growing popularity through what may be labelled a restructuring in the relative interpretations of risks.
Although nuclear energy as such is not necessarily considered less risky today than 20 years ago, nuclear energy is now being seen in a more favourable light relatively to the risk interpretations of competing energy sources.
When discussing current European and North American nuclear power policies, it is important to emphasize the existence of the several hundred reactors that were constructed in the period up to the 1980s. Most of these will soon reach -or have already reached -their designed lifetime. A major issue is therefore what will happen to these reactors and in particular whether they will be replaced by new nuclear reactors or, rather, by other energy facilities. Since new reactor construction is linked to substantial investment risks, an alternative has here been to carry out far-reaching upgrading of existing reactors and expand their operating lives by 10-20 years or even longer. This strategy has also proved politically viable in countries whose governments are less pro-nuclear. The same goes for the trend to raise electricity output by way of more frequent fuel reloading and/or ambitious turbine improvements. Electrical effects of nuclear units have in many cases been increased by around 10% or even more -in Sweden the ambitious plan is now to increase effects by 20%! Taking a look more specifically at the most expansive nuclear countries, we see that
Finland and France are currently the only two Western countries that have actually started to build new nuclear units during the past five-year period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . Both are countries that, in contrast to the majority of Western nations, have only to a marginal extent allowed Chernobyl to influence their long-term pro-nuclear paths. In
Finland, which currently has four reactors in operation and now builds a fifth one, there has been a strong political consensus about the necessity for additional nuclear capacity, whereby even the Green Party has been positive to the development. This political development has been made dependent upon the condition that nuclear operators can demonstrate a safe solution for handling spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. This has motivated Finland to be very active in this field and the country hence became the first in the world to actually start construction of a deep repository for direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel (Kaijser and Högselius 2007) .
France is unique in being the only large country with a nearly total dependence on nuclear power for its electricity supply (78% Sarkozy has recently confirmed his support for a second unit. However, this extremely ambitious project of totally replacing old nuclear reactors with new ones has been made conditional upon the successful completion of the Flamanville reactor, and the construction of this unit is currently being severely delayed -as is its sister reactor that Finland has ordered from France, with nuclear engineering company Areva currently making huge losses in Finland. Hence it is still too early to say whether France's reliance on nuclear power will survive the planned grand transition to a new reactor generation. The situation is similar in Finland, which also aims to build a sixth reactor but where a failure with the fifth reactor would make it extremely difficult to realize another project.
Apart from Finland and France, the countries with a long-standing pro-nuclear stance include the former communist countries in Eastern Europe. East European governments are as a rule extremely positive to nuclear power, which can be interpreted both in terms of the communist legacy -in the communist era, there was virtually no debate on nuclear power and in addition waste issues were avoided in the discussions due to export of spent nuclear fuel to the Soviet Union -and the sense of humiliation experienced in the new Eastern members of the EU following the forced nuclear decommissioning of old Soviet reactors (in Lithuania, Slovakia and Bulgaria).
The harsh EU policy towards East European nuclear power is unique in the world regarding the way in which foreign or supranational political actors have actually managed to directly enforce a nuclear decommissioning process against the will of the country in question. The policy is comparable only to Western attempts to force
Iran and North Korea to abandon their enrichment and reprocessing ambitions, respectively. The shut-down of a number of old Soviet reactors in Lithuania, Slovakia and Bulgaria -of which only the Lithuanian is of the Chernobyl type -was set as a condition for EU accession of these countries, which started to be negotiated in 1997.
The EU's policy was here supported by the West European nuclear industry as an effective way of contrasting, in media reports, old Soviet nuclear technology with the arguably much safer and more modern nuclear reactors developed in the West.
However, the EU policy of forced decommissioning has strengthened rather than weakened the support for nuclear power in Eastern Europe, and many East European countries now wish to replace their Soviet-era nuclear capacities with new nuclear units.
Further east, Russia is a country with a long and legendary nuclear past and with a But there are also countries for which a nuclear expansion seems out of sight. To these belong Sweden, Germany, Belgium and Spain. There are tendencies for an 14 increased support for nuclear power in some of these countries, notably Sweden, but the continued political sensitivity of the nuclear issue means in practice that new reactor constructions seem very distant. Spanish governmental policy is for a phaseout of all nuclear power by 2030, i.e. when the existing reactors' operating lives run out (Romeo et al. 2009 ). And in both Germany and Belgium, the nuclear issue is still extremely infected. In Germany nuclear power is being phased out by way of an exactly specified 'rest life' for each reactor (e.g. Bode 2009 ). In Belgium been a difficult topic in Western democracies, particularly at a time when the responsible authorities demanded that the 'best' location from a geological point of view be used. This has been referred to as a 'systematic' siting strategy and it led to preliminary geological investigations in municipalities that were not necessarily happy about the prospects for placing a 'nuclear waste dump' in their backyard.
Recent years, however, have seen a transition from a systematic to a 'pragmatic' siting strategy, where the geological optimum is weighed against public acceptance (Kojo 2006) . The demand from authorities is no longer necessarily that the geological conditions be 'ideal', but only that they meet certain specified minimum safety criteria. In practice this has so far led to nuclear waste facilities being sited in municipalities that already have nuclear power plants on their territory and which thereby usually regard nuclear power with pride and as a natural part of everyday life.
Nuclear waste facilities are now also increasingly being seen as positive from a local employment and economic development perspective (Sweden, Finland, Belgium are good examples).
The evolving actor landscape
Energy companies which operate nuclear power plants have during the past 5-10 years increasingly used the climate threat and the energy security challenge as powerful lobbying arguments vis-à-vis governments for supporting the role of nuclear power in the overall energy system. For a long time in the post-Chernobyl era, the nuclear industry was in a very difficult position, but as discussed above most governments are now increasingly receptive to the industry's pro-nuclear interests.
A major difference compared to the last wave of nuclear expansion 30-40 years ago, however, is that licensing procedures and environmental regulations are vastly more complex nowadays, so that the path from a general political endorsement to actual reactor construction is very long and far from straight-forward. It is considered important to involve public participation so as to avoid future conflicts. At the same time many nuclear operators have been privatized and even internationalized, thereby increasing the perceived distance between the nuclear industry and the state bureaucracy -a 'decoupling' which poses a stark contrast to the past, when nuclear energy programmes were often developed with majority state ownership. This growing organizational separation contributes to a suspicion from the side of investors when it comes to political commitments. Particularly in politically divided countries where national elections might suddenly result in a shift from a pro-nuclear to an anti-nuclear government -as happened, for example, in Germany in 1998 -potential nuclear investors find the political risks of new nuclear projects unacceptable. Apart from Germany, Sweden is a good example of this state of affairs.
The result can then be that nuclear developments stagnate despite outspoken government support and available investors, since there is a fear that this harmonic situation might not last long.
But energy companies are also hesitant to invest in nuclear power due to market risk.
Nuclear power plant construction, following the enormous demands for security arrangements, have become very expensive and there is no guarantee that a nuclear power plant that starts to be constructed today will actually be competitive in a Hence the overall trend has been towards a decoupling of civil from military interests.
The situation in Russia is somewhat different, with the links between the military and the civil parts of the nuclear sector still being significant.
However, even though the current links between nuclear interests in the defence sector and civil nuclear interests have weakened, it should be emphasized that the historical legacy of combined civil-military nuclear programmes continues to be clearly visible in the structure and organization of the nuclear sectors in several countries. The most obvious expression of this phenomenon is the fact that the European nuclear weapons countries (France, Russia, Britain) coincide with those pursuing nuclear reprocessing for civil purposes. Apart from this, the historically rooted military aspects of all nuclear engineering activities continue to be used in the public debate by anti-nuclear groups as an argument against civil nuclear power. Thus, although in practice military and civil nuclear activities are now large separate from each other in most Western countries, there is a strong and arguably growing fear among the public that the acquisition of civil nuclear technology developed in the West might be used as a basis for developing military nuclear competencies in other parts of the world. The nuclear industry has responded to this concern with nuclear proliferation by setting out to develop 'proliferation-resistant' nuclear technologies (see further the section on the nuclear engineering industry below). There have also been attempts to create strictly regulated internationalized pools for uranium enrichment, with the aim to prevent new nuclear countries -such as Iran -from developing their own enrichment facilities, since these could potentially be used as a platform for military projects (Tollefson 2008 ).
The anti-nuclear and environmental movements form an important category of actors, although they differ markedly in strength and style between countries and regions.
The German anti-nuclear movement is probably the strongest in the Western world and it has been instrumental in contributing to the paralysis that currently characterizes nuclear policymaking in Germany. Finland is a good counter-example where the environmental movement has not principally been against nuclear power, but has rather acknowledged it as a domestic energy source, while also taking active part in shaping nuclear policy in a 'greener' direction (Kaijser & Högselius 2007 ).
There are many examples of environmental groupings in the West that have turned increasingly pro-nuclear in recent years. Still, European and American environmentalists generally do not accept the argument that nuclear power is needed to counter the climate threat. Instead, they favour the rise of renewable energy developments. There is frequently an economically motivated fear among environmentalists that nuclear expansion might put a brake to the expansion of renewable energy sources such as wind power.
In party politics, the anti-nuclear movements have traditionally been represented by parties with an agrarian profile and by parts of the social democracy. Agrarian parties with decentralizing agendas have traditionally been anti-nuclear, since nuclear energy has since long been linked to a politics of centralization and large-scale industrialization. Social democratic parties in Europe have developed a highly ambiguous stance to nuclear power, with an anti-nuclear stance being rooted in links to the peace movement and to the women movement and a more pro-nuclear stance stemming from strong links to industrial interests and labour unions in the energy sector. Since the late 1980s, anti-nuclear interests are also represented in some countries through strongly environmentally-focused parties such as the Greens in Sweden and Germany.
Public acceptance of nuclear power has grown almost everywhere in recent years, obviously much in response to the climate threat and the crisis for fossil fuels. In other words, the public has been susceptible to nuclear industry's argument that nuclear power is needed to counter climate change. It appears as if the youngest generations are less critical to nuclear power than previous generations. This is a long-term trend where it has also been observed that young people of today or more pro-nuclear than were young people 20-30 years ago (Sandberg 2008) . The new generations do not share the older generation's traumatic memories of Harrisburg and
Chernobyl -names with which many young people today cannot even make any associations at all. However, this has in some cases led to tense situations in the relationship between parliamentary fractions and the general public, since large antinuclear interests, as mentioned above, continue to play important roles in agrarian, environmental and social democratic parties.
The trend is not necessarily the same everywhere, however. As shown by Greenberg (2009) in a recent study, the US public is relatively pro-nuclear, with 52% favouring an increased or constantly kept reliance on nuclear power. But here the older generation appears to be much more positive to nuclear power than younger generations, with 63% in the age group 65+ favouring an increased reliance on nuclear power but only 33% in the group up to 35 years.
Investment policies and national capacities
Historically, investments in nuclear power in Europe and North America were strongly linked to efforts to build a strong national capacity in nuclear engineering. A strong nuclear engineering competence base was seen as crucial particularly at a time when nuclear power was regarded as a 'generic' future technology which, in addition, was directly linked to key defence interests.
Today, such links between nuclear investments and long-term state interests is not at all that strong. Following the neo-liberal turn in Western politics (i.e. from the 1980s), governments have become much more reluctant to be directly involved in nuclear projects. Several governments have openly declared that they will 'leave it to the market' to decide whether or not (and what type of) new nuclear units should be built.
With increasingly liberalized electricity markets, many countries no longer regard it as acceptable that the government would favour any particular energy technology as long as it meets the regulatory demands as codified in laws and rules; the trend is towards a technology-neutral investment policy. The influence of governments on energy developments has thereby become much more indirect. Hence whereas some governments now openly support new nuclear projects in the overall energy debate, they are often both unable and unwilling to directly support concrete projects. This is the case, for example, in the United Kingdom. Sweden is also a country where a similar stance seems to be emerging.
There is some correlation between countries that pursue new reactor construction and those where the state is in (direct or indirect) control of the nuclear sector -notably France and Russia. Finland is also pursuing new reactor construction, without any far-reaching state ownership but with a strong political backing which in combination a political culture formed around long-term national consensus has given the nuclear industry sufficient confidence to invest. A further contributing factor is here that the new Finnish reactor is owned by those industrial companies that will use its electricity output, creating a situation where the energy has been pre-contracted for a very long period in advance.
Another way to seek stable conditions for investments -and lower the risks -has In Eastern Europe, incoming foreign investment is regarded as a possible solution for several countries that want to replace the nuclear capacities that the EU has 'stolen' from them with new nuclear facilities, but which are financially too weak to be able to realize such a project on their own. This weakness -which refers to both state and private actors -has increased enormously in proportions following the recent global financial crisis, which has hit many Eastern countries particularly hard. Hence it appears unlikely that new reactor projects in Eastern Europe will be domestically financed, if they are realized at all. Foreign investment in East European nuclear power remains sensitive, however, and the most important investment trend there seems instead to be towards an extension of reactor operating lives and expansion of turbine capacity.
The latter phenomenon -extension of reactor operating lives and expansion of turbine capacity -is very common in Western Europe and North America, too.
Particularly in countries where the nuclear issue remains highly sensitive, nuclear operators have found that the only acceptable way of expanding nuclear energy is to increase the effects and operating lives of already existing reactors. Sweden, for example, despite having shut down (for political reasons) two of its originally 12
reactors, actually has a much larger nuclear capacity than ever before, thanks to improvements of existing reactors!
The development of the nuclear engineering industry
The post-Chernobyl stagnation in nuclear power developments had far-reaching effects not only for energy companies, but also for the nuclear engineering industry and the R&D community. As a result of the stagnation, these faced a collapsed market for much of their goods and services.
In the nuclear engineering industry, the post-Chernobyl period saw a trend towards market concentration. Reactor producers, most of which were already very large firms, went through a wave of mergers and acquisitions, seeking synergies and economies of scale as a way to cut costs. In the reactor business a few large multinational companies are now totally dominant, formed on the basis of firms that, until recently, were intimately linked to vital interests of national security.
International technological dependencies in the supply of components and services of various kinds have thereby increased. As a result, much of European and American nuclear engineering is nowadays in the hands of French and Japanese firms. An interesting exception from this pattern is the Canadian nuclear giant AECL, which has remained a relatively independent and dynamic nuclear engineering company. AECL has a long track-record on the export side, having exported nuclear reactors to Romania, Argentina, India, South Korea and China -largely coinciding with regions where nuclear energy is currently expanding. This is historically based on AECL's focus on heavy-water reactor technology, which, as discussed above, has been an attractive choice in many developing countries for national security reasons. Even AECL, however, is being globalized in response to the enormous cost pressure, and international dependencies are considerable: hence, for example, the company's new ACR advanced reactor design will include a scheme with 'major components built in US shipyards' (WNA 2009b In parallel with the radical restructuring and globalization of the nuclear engineering industry, however, the new pro-nuclear policy trends described earlier in this chapter have stimulated a new optimism in innovation and technological development. For a long time following the Chernobyl disaster, innovation activities stagnated along with the industry as a whole. This has endangered competence-building for the future, with many countries feeling highly troubled trying to ensure a continuity of educated nuclear researchers and engineers. The problem has been most severe in countries which operate large nuclear power plants but which have already decided to shut them down on the long-term. In such countries it has not appeared a safe career choice for the new generations to study nuclear engineering. The more recent trends, however, seem to be reversing this negative development, and both education and research in the nuclear field are now expanding again.
The United States and Russia, the former superpowers, have been particularly active in promoting nuclear R&D. Such policies are linked partly to efforts to respond to the demands for effective fuel cycle activities (particularly the waste issue) and partly to the argument that many nuclear reactors are ageing and will have to be replaced by more modern reactor types. Russia is pursuing an aggressive policy for exports of nuclear goods and services to non-Western countries, and the nuclear engineering complex is arguably one of few hi-tech sectors in which Russia -whose economy is heavily based on natural resources -may have an impact on the global market.
The United States have taken the initiative to two major internationally oriented R&D programmes: the Generation IV Forum (GIF) and the Global Nuclear Energy It is thus an attempt to challenge the dominant view that reprocessing is inevitably linked to the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Obviously, however, both GIF and GNEP must also be seen in relation to the US nuclear community's lobbying efforts to revive nuclear power research and development in general.
Conclusion: Prospects for nuclear expansion
This chapter has shown that the early 21 st century has seen significant changes in nuclear power policies in Europe, Russia and North America. These changes point at the possibility that 'Chernobyl's legacy' might be overcome, possibly paving the way for a new period of nuclear dynamism among the 'old' nuclear power nations. The fate of the Western nuclear industry will most probably be decided by the ways in which governments, utilities and the nuclear industry choose to deal with the many reactors that are now quickly approaching the end of their operating lives. Hundreds of reactors must be replaced within the next 10-20 years if nuclear power is to remain an energy source of any significance in Europe and North America. Some analysts think that the industry, given enormous investment and political risks, which are arguably much higher now than at the time of the previous construction boom, will not manage such a challenging transition even if governments pursue pro-nuclear policies, and that nuclear power in many countries will 'self-die'. There are some indications -notably in the form of the Japanese takeover of large parts of the Western nuclear engineering industry -that the nuclear engineering industry in Europe and North America is already preparing for a global shift of its centre of gravity towards Asia.
On a medium-term, the trend is rather towards an extension of reactor operating lives and an expansion of turbine capacity. Such a development, with the nuclear industry staying alive only thanks to the momentum of past achievements, is considered less risky from an investment perspective -though not necessarily from an environmental perspective -and it is seen as politically acceptable in most countries.
Further developments in the policy field will also depend on how the industry and the responsible authorities manage the fuel cycle and in particular the nuclear waste issue. This is in turn dependent both upon public acceptance of nuclear waste facilities and upon geological and technological developments in the field. A revival of reprocessing has recently been pointed at as desirable in some countries, but in practice the reprocessing industry is stagnating. Moreover, the technologically extremely ambitious plans for the fuel cycle as outlined in major American and Russian nuclear programmes appear to belong to a much too distant future, in terms of their actual realization, for them to have any strong impact on commercial-scale developments within the next 10-20 years. In the meantime it appears more likely that advances in renewable energy technologies will move ahead and conquer markets. In any case the actual impact of nuclear power policies on actual industry developments must be analyzed in close relation to the overall dynamism in the energy sector as a whole, which is both turbulent and complex.
